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Summary: Institutional competition stirs the interest of economists following a certain 
cyclical pattern. In this context, it is very interesting to look back at the experience of Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks of adopting monetary competition to stabilize their political and economic power after the 
crash of the war communism (and the attempts to annihilate money). The currency competition 
lasts less than two years and ends up with establishing the chervonetz as the only monetary unit. As 
a whole, this can be considered a successful economic experience. Nevertheless, the main 
conditions for effective institutional competition were not met – the two currencies were unequally 
positioned and, what is more, the institutional complementarity principle was not present. Other 
basic market institutions were lacking or much diminished in functions – mostly the property rights, 
the principle of free price setting as well as competition in the political and ideological sphere. In 
general, the NEP model is utterly controversial and its market structure is to a great extent false. 
This is what actually doomed monetary stability afterwards and left no room for money competition 
to spread its wings. Despite all these shortcomings, even in its reduced form, the monetary 
competition, gives a number of positive, though only temporary, results. This reveals the presence of 
purely technological characteristics of currency competition related to the behavior of money users. 
In part one we remind briefly of the chronology of events in the first years of the Bolshevik’s 
regime; part two shows the dynamics of currency competition between the sovznak and the 
chervonetz, and in the last part we attempt to draw some theoretical observations related to the 
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* Preparing this paper I have benefited from a long discussion with Yurii Goland and from the 
comments of Enrico Colombatto, Vladimir Mau, Serguei Ignatiev, Yorgos Rizopolos and Vasil 
Prodanov. The paper was written during my stay as a visiting researcher in International Center for 
Economic Research (ICER), Torino (June-July , 2006).   2
I.  Introduction 
 
Economists’ interest in institutions, in their evolution and forms follows a certain cycle
1. 
The same goes for institutional competition as a main alternative model of consciously 
constructed institutions. In a broader context this is a question of how credibility emerges, 
whether this is through competition and choice or through a centralized enforcement.  
Roughly speaking, institutional competition means competition and selection of rules of 
economic behavior, an opportunity for the customer to choose the rules (a choice based on 
customers’ interests). Institutional competition has long been at the center of attention for the 
Austrian School. Monetary competition is a particular type of institutional competition, which 
allows the concurrent circulation of two or more different currencies
2. In order for it to be 
complete and effective, it is necessary that the different monetary units have equal starting 
positions and most of all equal legal constraints in order to eliminate initial distortion of the 
money demand structure. In fact, money competition has always been in place, whether in a 
complete or in an incomplete form in various configurations and different historical periods
3. 
Institutional competition, monetary competition including, has in addition certain requirements 
that are too often forgotten. Its effectiveness depends to a great extent on the institutional 
complementarity as well as on the presence of competition in other spheres of the economy 
and society
4.  
In this context, we find very interesting the attempt of the Bolsheviks and Lenin to use 
the monetary competition for stabilizing their political power after  the crash of the war 
communism (when there was an attempt to militarize the economy and to abolish a number of 
fundamental economic institutions)
5. In the NEP period (1921-1927) there was an attempt to 
introduce limited market institutions, including stable money  – the chervonets. Monetary 
competition lasts less than two years (11/1922 -03/1924), but it alone gives positive results 
despite the ideological framework it was wrapped in. Still, the main preconditions for 
successful competition were not present – there was a lack of equality in the two different 
monetary units and above all a violation of the principle of institutional complementarity (the 
absence of an “institutional complexity”). Other basic market institutions were lacking or much 
diminished i n their functions – mostly the stable property rights, the principle of free price 
formation as well as competition in the political and ideological sphere (here, in fact, the 
monopoly of the Bolshevik party is even greater than in the war communism period; the red 
tape is also increasing!) As a whole, the NEP model is extremely controversial and its market 
                                                 
1 The reasons for this are various – globalization, technological changes, crash of planned economy etc. This 
is a topic of a different discussion.  Today’s debates of the EU functioning and above all of the fiscal 
competition, the possibilities for institutional competition upon the EU enlargement with the new member 
countries etc. are examples of the renewed  interest in institutional competition 
2 Currency competition in its various aspects has always been at the centre of attention for the Austrian 
School. It is sufficient to mention the name of C. Menger, L. Mises, V. Smith, F. Hayek, and J. Buchanan as well 
as contemporary Austrians like R. Vaubel, P. Salin, G. Selgin, L. White,  K.Dowd, etc.  
3 For more details see the authors listed in the previous footnote. 
4 Besides, institutional competition is always related to the economic and political interests of certain groups. 
For more details see Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2006).  
5 Studying the “ways of entering” the communist economic model provides a valuable information on “ways 
of exiting” it.   
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structure is to a great extent ostensible
6. This is what actually doomed the monetary stability 
afterwards and left no room for money competition to spread its wings. Despite all these 
shortcomings it is important to emphasize that the currency competition, even in its reduced 
form, gives positive results, though only in a short run. This reveals the presence of purely 
technological characteristics of monetary competition which produce positive effects.  
In part one I remind briefly of the chronology of events in the first years of the 
Bolshevik’s regime; part two shows the dynamics of monetary competition between the 
sovznak and the chervonetz, and in the last part I attempt to draw some theoretical 
observations related to the necessary conditions for a successful institutional competition.  
 
II.  From the War Communism to NEP  – a brief chronology  
 
Between late XIX and early XX century in Russia periods of collapsed public finances 
and monetary instability (mainly due to wars and social upheaval) (alternated with) (and) 
periods of attempts at recovery (followed one after another in succession). After the 
accumulation of sufficient foreign reserves and following some intermediate stages, in 1879 the 
Gold standard was introduced by law (during S. U. Witte’s government (1849-1915)), and 
thus Russia joined the “golden” (and civilised) countries. The economic reforms extended by 
Witte (he himself inherited them from A. Abaza, A. Bunge and I. Vishegradsky), were taken 
further by P. Stolipin (1862-1911) who kept the national money stable and accelerated the 
agrarian reform (9/XI/1906). As a result of these reforms, the traditional communal peasant 
municipalities (mir) were partly turned into individual private enterprises (it is still arguable 
today to what extent this was accomplished coercively or voluntarily and evolutionary). The 
success of these changes was to a certain extent promoted by strengthening the role of a 
specially created in 1883 Peasant Agricultural Bank (Krestianskii pozemel’nii bank), which 
played a mediating role by buying the land from land owners and granting preferential credit to 
peasants who wished to use their plots of land individually (as private property)
7. The social 
and political climate in early XX century was characterised by an extremely aggressive 
revolutionary movement, which took numerous victims. The national representative bodies 
(Dumas created after the revolution 1905) were dissolved several times on the grounds of 
giving a tribune to straightforward revolutionary ideas.  
Russia’s involvement in WWI (1914 – 1917) put an end to the monetary stability in 
the country; the Gold standard was abandoned (with a decree of July the 23
rd, 1914, 4 days 
after the war started, which also allowed (contributed to) a fivefold increase of the Gosbank’s 
issuance limits), with money supply escalating (only for 1917 it went up 6 times). Prices were 
rising, and the Rouble was devaluating uncontrollably. The deep grain crisis of 1916 led to 
introducing the food apportionment for peasantry (prodrazverstka), (this same method was 
                                                 
6 The War Communism model (with all the consequences for the coming introduction of the NEP and its 
characteristics) is most often seen as a coercive or externally imposed by the war political measure (M. Dobb, 
P. Baran, A. Gerschenkron) or as an implementation of the communist ideas (A.Yugoff, P. Roberts, B. Brutzkus, 
S. Richman, L. Lih, P. Boettke), or both  (A.Nove, E.Carr). The problems of the nature of the War Communism 
and the NEP are partly considered within the discussion on the possibilities for computing under communism 
(see Boettke, 1990 for details). 
7 As a result of the agrarian reform, around the beginning of WWI the peasantry owned about 2/3 of the land 
in European Russia (the remaining 1/3 was owned by the landowners (pomeshiki)), Fedorov, 2002, p. 376. The 
good  description of the economic policy (agrarian and industrial) in Russia prior to October revolution is 
down by Alexander Gerschenkron in Gerscehkron (1976, [1965]).   4
used subsequently also by the Bolsheviks in the war communism period). In March 1917, 
Nikolai II renounced his throne and, after a short period of dual power by the caretaker 
government of Kerenski and the Soviets, the power shifted into the hands of the Bolsheviks’ 
and their leaders Trotsky, Lenin (who had recently returned form Switzerland in the infamous 
armoured wagon), Sverdlov, Kamenov and others. The ways and reasons for taking over by 
the Bolsheviks are still disputed today but this is not our subject here. It is an indisputable fact 
that they radically militarised and centralised the economy for ideological reasons
8 but also 
forced by reality; a devastating struggle with the white movement (the civil war) as well as 
foreign intervention took place. After sabotages by employees and technical problems the 
Emission (Issuing) Bank was taken over by force (on October 28
th 1917) and turned into a 
People’s Bank, closed down and turned into an instrument of the government for managing the 
state’s finances
9. The war communism began. 
The banking system was nationalized by decree following the Decrees on war and 
peace, and the Decree on the land. The military principles in the economy and the militarization 
of labor were applied all over – all enterprises with more than 5 workers were nationalized; 
about 50 “glavki”, i.e. centralized administrative control of different areas of the economy and 
the social life were created. Rooted in the belief that “communist society will not know 
money”, radical actions for the abolishment of money took place. Of course, this happens not 
through administrative prohibition but through economic means following the laws of 
quantitative theory of money by purposeful and intentionally uncontrollable issuance, i.e. 
through increasing the volume of money supply ("a major weapon" against capitalism, if we cite 
E. Preobrajensky)
10. The goal pursued in this way was to eliminate the exploiting class (but 
actually those who suffered were the peasants themselves whose production was purchased at 
fixed prices). It was considered that an over issuance of money under socialism could not lead 
to devastating the economy. Here is an illustrative citation of Trotsky’s speech at the second 
congress of the communist international on July the 23
rd, 1929 regarding the issuance of paper 
money after the war in Western Europe:  
 
“The issuance of paper money continues to escalate with a growing speed. While in 
Soviet Russia the growing amount of paper money and their devaluation together with the 
development of the public economy, the planed redistribution of products and the growing 
naturalization of the wages emerges only as a result o f the decline of “commodity and money 
relations” in the capitalist countries the growing amount of paper money is a sign of the 
deepening economic chaos and inevitable collapse”, Trotsky, 2005 [1920], p. 479. 
 
The demolition of money was complete. The monetary supply in this period was 
exceptionally diverse (Timoshina, 1996): it consisted of Tsarski Roubles (Nikolaevki and 
Romanovki), Dumski Roubles of different issues, Kerenki  – single issues (shaped like 
newspapers), Kerenki printed by the Soviet government. The Soviet government printed 
                                                 
8 Already in “The State and the Revolution “ written in 1917 Lenin mentions that the new economic policy will 
be managed after the principles of the postal service under the control of the armed proletariat (on other 
occasions Lenin states that the national economy will function as a giant factory or following the principles of 
a universal moneyless accounting and under a nation-wide control by workers). 
9 The Gossbank was opened in 1920 (its issuing function was executed by a department in Narkomfin of 
RSFSR). 
10 According to Apostol (1921), p. 884 monthly issues on average develop as follows: November – December 
1917 (2 908 mill.r.), 1918  (2 430 mill.r), 1919  (14 167 mlln. r.), January – February –March 1920 (38 300 mill.r). 
The money supply in Ukraine is similar (? postol, 1921, p. 884 -885).    5
Kerenki until February 1919 and each month up to 2-3 billion unbacked Kerenki entered 
circulation so as to come up to 2/3 of the total amount of Kerenki in January 1919. Printing 
speed was “furious” , the mint operated day and night and in the second half of 1919 money 
printing consumed about 45-60% of the budget revenue. The revenues from printing money 
(seigniorage) fell drastically. Following the calculations of Preobrajensky, the revenues fell from 
2500 mln Roubles in 1 917 to 386 mln Roubles in 1919 and 146 mln in 1921 
(Katzelenellenbaum, 1925, p. 70, and chart 3). Private and local money (monetary substitutes) 
appeared in many areas in an attempt to overcome the money crisis.  
 
Table 1. Structure of money supply on 1/04/1920 
 
Kinds of money certificates   Volume  % of money supply 
Tsartski  21 796  6.4 
Dumski  40 358  11.9 
Kerenki  46 768  13.8 
Soviet emission  230 777  67.9 
          Piatakovski  221 282   
          Exchange certificates      9 495   
Total  339 697  100 
Source: Apostol (1921), p. 883 
 
The Rouble quickly devalues against foreign currencies (tabl. 2).  
 
Table 2 Exchange rate of the Rouble against the UK Pound in London for cheques 
exchangeable in Petersburg (Leningrad) – roubles for 10 Pounds.  
 
   1914  
Sept 
Oct  Nov  Dec  1915  
Jan 
April  July  Oct     
Highest  112,5  110  115,2  117  110,5  114,5  135  139,75     
Lowest  122,5  117  118,5  118  117  120  148  144,25     
   1916  
Jan 
April  July  Oct  1917  
Jan 
March  April  July  Sept  Oct 
Highest  153,5  151,5  155,6  153,5  162  164  162,25  203,6  273,5  311 
Lowest  163,75  156,5  157,25  163,5  170  171,5  182  226,5  322,5  377,5 
Source: Katzenellenbaum (1925), p. 104 
 
A mass famine in 1921 took millions of victims (5 mil., 20% of the population starves). 
At the same time expenditure on the war was estimated at 50 billion golden Roubles. The 
decline in production for the War Communism period (1918 – 1921) is probably one of the 
deepest declines in the whole Russian and later Soviet economic history (see table 8 in the 
appendix). War Communism, which makes a practical attempt to replace the coordination 
through the market and prices with a coordination through bureaucracy and planning (or in   6
Lenins words – accounting - uchet), leads to a complete abolition of the incentives to work
11. 
This becomes obvious from the following table 3, referring to the railway industry, where for 
some lines the rate of absence from work reaches 40% and the absence without acceptable 
reasons  (progul)  reaches 10%. And also from table 4 which  presents the rate of work 
desertion in Ukraine.  
 
Table 3 Work unattendance rate in 1920 for the railway industry  
 
1920   % of absentees from work 
for various reasons (total) 
% of absentees from work 
for unknown or 
unacceptable reasons 
(progul) 
January  29.8  6.3 
February  29.8  5.1 
March  28.2  5.3 
April  28.8  5.2 
May   26.5  4.4 
June  23.8  4.3 
July  24.8  4.5 
August  25.8  5.3 
September  25.7  4.6 
October  25.3  4.8 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 766 
 
Table 4 Work desertion and unattendance in Ukraine for the first half of 1921  
  




% of absentees from work 
    February  March  April 
Petrovski    547  17  17  20 
Yuzovski     357  30  -  - 
Makeevski  4 462  24  32  33 
Don-Yurevski  1 921  21  34  31 
Luganski  3 565  28  43  43 
Harkovski  4 596  31  25  32 
Kramatorski  2 028  29  30  31 
Druvkovski  1 545  28  33  31 
Taganrogski   4 675  23  21  31 
Debalcevski     721  38  45  43 
                                                 
11 According to general estimations (made then and now), after the NEP establishment the red tape was 
increased instead of decreased which contradicts the basic propagated ideas that the NEP is a radical 
replacement of the bureaucratic coordination with a market one.     7










Mariupolski  2 466  40  45  54 
Konstantinovski       217  20  19  - 
Kerchenski      464  -  -  - 
Suvinski  1 891  -  -  - 
Nikolaevski  3 218  -  -  - 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 1427 
 
According to Larin (after Russian Economist, 1921, p. 769) one worker in 1920 produced in 
average 45% of what he used to produce before the war. In 1920 the loss of working days is 
as follows:  because of factory outage – 68 days, because of sickness – 19 days, for other 
reasons – 35.5 days and because of holidays – 65 days which leaves a total of only 187.5 
working days.   
The condition of all social groups deteriorated. Peasants (mainly the middle ones) 
suffered the “price scissors” (because their products were bought at fixed prices and inflation 
was high). The working class also suffered
12. The condition of the army (most of it former 
peasants) worsened too; the same goes for the clergy. The only class gaining economic 
advantage during the war communism was the newly emerged and quickly growing 
bureaucracy  – on the state and party level, as well as the speculators-brokers (called 
nepman).  
There was an effort to compensate the decline in production with an increase in the 
labour intensity and overtime working – table 4, but this attempt turned unsuccessful.  
 
Table 5 Overtime working hours in Moscow 1919 – 1920   
 
  % overtime work  Overtime working 
hours, realized by a 
worker in a month   
Daily overtime 
working hours 
October 1919  15.8  62.8  2.9 
November 1919  18.3  62.2  3.9 
December 1919  12.7  53.9  2.5 
January 1920  25  67.3  3.7 
February 1920  14.2  37.8  2 
March 1920  17.9  46.8  2.3 
April 1920 14.4 37.9 2 
May 1920 15.3 68.8 3.4 
June 1920  17.9  33.2  1.5 
Source: Russian Economist (1921), p. 752 
 
                                                 
12 Because the majority of the workers receive their wages in kind they suffer relatively little form the prices 
growth. According to some western authors we could think of the NEP as of a certain change of the agrarian 
policy (of the policy towards the peasants) and not of a total change of the economic model (Lih, 1986, 1991).    8
Social upheavals took place. Peasants and workers went on strike and the climax was 
the Kronstadt naval rebellion (March 1921)
13 when sailors and red army soldiers mutinied, i.e. 
part of the Bolshevik revolution’s driving force.  
It was extremely difficult for Lenin to convince his comrades that a radical change of 
the economic policy of the war communism was indispensable. The official decision was made 
in March 1921 at the X congress of the RCP(b) when it was agreed to have reestablished 
some elements of the market economy and to a certain extent of the private property (for 
enterprises of up to 20 workers), a foreign capital to be allowed in Russia (in the form of 
concessions), the razverstka to be replaced with a food-supply tax – prodnalog (at first a 
physical – tax in kind, and later, in 1924, a monetary tax)
14 and to introduce stable money. 
State capitalism entered the discussion together with denationalization, self-supporting running 
(hozrashchet) ect
15.  
The discussion of the principles and methods of introducing a stable currency (money) 
is very interesting at that time (it is analyzed by Goland, 1991, 1991, 1998, Goland, 2003). 
To summarize it roughly - the discussion reveals the two main (and well known from the other 
monetary reforms) approaches to monetary stabilization (monetarists and economists). Those 
who claim that money should come first and (within this approach it is arguable whether the 
new money should replace the old money immediately or after a period of competition with the 
old one) and those who claim that stable money comes after a stable economy. This discussion 
can be traced in all countries and at the international conferences which try to reestablish the 
monetary stability lost during the war. At the end of 1921 a special sitting took place where 50 
experts offered their ideas of a monetary reform (Goland, 1991).  
Among those in favor of starting with the money were Sokolnikov
16, Kutler
17, 
Yurovski, Sheiman, Katzenellenbaum, Kondratiev and others.
18 Their main opponents were 
Trotsky, Preobrajensky and Buharin (who later on changed his conceptions and in the second 
half of the 20’s defended, together with A. Rikov, adherence to the NEP and was repressed 
by Stalin as a result). In the context of the monetary discussion other questions were also 
emphasized alongside the already mentioned (where to start from). These are the fundamental 
principles about the origin and nature of money, about the backed value of money (gold, 
energy and labor, bread, index of different goods); as well as technical details (such as the level 
                                                 
13 According to Lenin, the Kronstadt rebeillon is a cause to rethink a number of suggestions in the past and 
mostly “the attitude towards the peasantry and the small bourgeoisie” (Lenin, 1977, [1921], p. 237).  
14 In is rarely acknowledged that in general the prodnalog is much less of a market mechanism than the 
prodrazvertska, because it leaves less opportunity for choice and that in a way the prodnalog is a 
considerable regress f the market principles compared to the prodrazvertska. This reveals the entire 
controversy of the NEP. The technical details of the functioning of the prodrazvertska and prodnalog have 
rarely been the subject of analysis (no such analysis is found in Lenin’s speeches or written works). They are 
best described in Lih (1986), who also provides the most accurate English translation of the respective Russian 
terms.  
15 Regarding the ration War Communism /NEP see again Lih (1986, 1991) 
16 G. Sokolnikov (1888-1937) is a minister of finance between 1922 and 1926. His monetary stabilization plan 
dates back to 1918 (one the first to give him that hint was V. Tarnovski). In 1926 he resigns because he 
disagrees with Stalin’ s policy of abandoning the NEP. According to Sokolonikov the stable money is the only 
mechanism which can maintain a relative integration of Russia in the world economy.  
17 N. Kutler, for example, suggests that issuing rights are given to a commercial bank with a foreign capital 
(Goland 1991). There were also ideas of a direct adoption of a foreign currency (Atlas, 1969). It is remarkable 
that such an idea is a topic of discussion at all; in more recent times this was seen as extremely heretic.   
18 At the Genoa conference their ideas and suggestions are praised by Keynes who at the time still adheres to 
the orthodox ideas in monetary policy (supports the gold standard etc.).     9
at which the exchange rate should be fixed, etc. From the beginning of 1922 the so called 
“Sovznaki” were introduced (unbacked money); their issuance was renewed in 1923 (at the 
rate of 1 new sovznak = 100 sovznak emission 1922) along with the issuance of backed 
money – Chervontsi (7.74 gr. pure gold = 10 pre-Revolutionary golden coins)
19. Chervontsi 
were backed 25% with gold and currency (which was itself backed with gold) and 75% 
backed with liquid assets (bills etc). While the sovznaks were issued by the government, the 
chervontsi were issued by the reinstalled central bank - Gossbank (by the way its balance 
sheet was divided into two parts, similar to the other central banks at that time – issue and 
banking balance sheets published every two weeks in the newspapers).     
During the whole 1923 and the beginning of 1924 the sovznaki and the chervontsi 
were in parallel circulation, while attempts were made to artificially separate their circulation
20. 
The chervonetz entered the international currency markets and its credibility increased. The 
prohibition to finance the Soviet government budget with chervontsi contributed to its higher 
credibility. The budget was financed only by sovznaki (in October 1923 the chervontsi are 
already ¾ of the money supply therefore it is decided against their further emission). In 1922 
the  government  succeeded  to realize the first internal wheat loan which contributed to 
increasing its credibility.  In this period the chervonetz’s price appreciated against the sovznak 
and other currencies (mainly the US dollar) which were attributed to the Gossbank’s 
interventions. Prices of goods calculated in sovznaki were rising while prices in chervontsi were 
going down. In March 1924 a fter the sovznaki were intentionally devaluated (again by 
increasing their amount) and were repurchased at a rate of 50000 rubles for one golden ruble, 
the chervonetz became a convertible currency (its exchange rate was fixed to the gold). From 
March 31
st  the chervonetz became the sole currency and the monetary stabilization was 
complete
21. 
Unfortunately, the currency stability did not last long. After Lenin’s death (January 21
st 
1924) money became the pledge of different conflicts within the society and the party (for 
example Bukharin and Rikov were firm adherents to continuing the NEP), which will be 
discussed further on. The wheat crisis of 1925 and subsequently of 1926 put and end to the 
currency stabilization and following a few measures the dominating political ideas were again 
those of forced industrialization and strengthening the role of the state at the expense of the 
private sector and the market. Speculators and nepman – became known as enemies and 
threats to socialism, and turned into a target of political pursuits (nepmani-lovkatchi)
22. It is 
necessary to note that as back as 1925 the monetary supply began to grow following the 
                                                 
19 This happens for the first time on 12/10/1922. The Chervonetz faced a resistance and Lenin (who was 
undergoing a medical treatment at this time) often asked why they were not yet in circulation. The original idea 
was to name the currency Federal, Tselkovii or Grivna instead of Chervonetz. Different nominal golden 
Chervonetz entered circulation featuring a peasant and a female worker with the motto “Proletarii from all 
countries, unite!”. For the history of Chervonetz issuance and their design see the extremely interesting book 
by Gleizer, 1993, [1978]. 
20 According to Goland “persons of influence want the Sovznak to be preserved as a source of emission 
revenue…and they do not want to introduce chervontsi with a small nominal value” (Goland, 1991, p. 62).   
21 In 1924 all kinds of private money and monetary substitutions, widespread until then, were banned. (For 
details see Gleizer, 1993). In a way, the establishment of the Cervonetz was by force and by limiting the free 
initiative in the monetary sphere, t. e. limiting the currency competition!! 
22 For details see Goland (1998).   10
credits to the government granted by the Gossbank which decreased the backing of the 
chrvonetz (see table 6 )
23.  
It is important to note that while elements of economic liberalism emerge during the 
NEP period, the political sphere is characterised by increased monopoly of the Bolsheviks and 
the repression against the different-minded (it can be claimed that the retreats of the Bolsheviks 
in the economic sphere are compensated with strengthening their political positions, while in 
fact the reason for the retreat is preserving the political authority).  








III.  Currency competition – sovznak against chervonetz 
 
Two basic features distinguish the monetary reform during the NEP period
24. Firstly 
this is the search for monetary stability through pursuing convertibility and an exchange rate 
fixed to the gold, and secondly, this is the establishment of that stability as a choice of the 
money users. The first can be called a search for credibility from the top, from a political 
decision; the second is a search for credibility from the bottom – from the economic actors.  
Besides, in general, the competition between the two types of currency  – the 
chervonez and the sovznak, can be viewed as an institutional competition, as the first were 
issued by the Ministry of Finance (Narkomfin) while the second – by the reestablished central 
bank. The first was unbacked currency, while the second possessed the characteristics of a 
fixed by law backing at an exact exchange rate
25. And fourth, it is very important to recognize 
that the currency competition is limited and to a great extent sought by the Bolsheviks; it has 
certain goals, namely to sink the debt accumulated in sovznaks (through the debt devaluation) 
and begin from a clear start. This is also proved by the fact that the sovznaks’ devaluation is 
intentionally sought through the issuance of big volumes of this currency. The administrative and 
legal division of the spheres of circulation of the two currencies was kept during the whole 
period (to a different extent of course), up until the complete establishment of the chervonetz. 
In this case the free float also reflects these artificial constraints on the currency choice.  
                                                 
23 The economists of the Conjuncture Institute (N. Kondratiev) constantly signaled the negative effect this 
would have but they were ignored for various reasons. (see also Johnson and Temin, 1993, according to whom 
this finally turns the terms of trade against the peasantry – just the opposite of what was pursued by the 
Bolsheviks). 
24 Katzenellenbaum (1925) presents data on the dynamics of the monetary supply (in its different components), 
inflation, exchange rate, as well as a number of different monetary variables. Zaharii Solomonovich 
Katzellenbaum (1885 – 1960) graduates from the Moscow University in law and economics, as an author of a 
number of books on monetary theory. As a member of the Governing Council of the Gossbank, his signature 
stands on a great part of the issued Chervontsi. One of the few if not the only member of the Gossbank 
government who died a natural death, i.e. he was not repressed by Stalin (Gleizer, 1993, [1978]).  
25 As I mentioned, the Gossbank’s balance sheet was divided into two – banking and issuing departments. 
This imitates the way the Bank of England organizational structure. Today this structure can be seen as similar 
to some currency boards in Eastern Europe, for example Estonia and Bulgaria.    11
The dynamics of the monetary supply’s structure, which shows how the chervonetz 
replaces the sovznak, can be seen on the table bellow. The maximum is reached in March 
1924 when the chervonetz constitutes almost 84% of the monetary supply.  
 
Table 6 Dynamics of the monetary supply January 1923 – October 1924  
 
     Amount of 
Chervontsi 
transferred to the 
bank by the bank 












treasury issues in 
circulation 
"Sovsnaks" in 
mlns of Rubles 
Percentage of 
chetvontsi in 











1 1923 1,118  97,7  1,994  3  3,148
2    1,93  78,9  2,629  6,3  4,193
3    3  66,2  3,236  10,6  5,132
4    4,5  61,9  4,482  14,8  6,486
5    6  63,8  6,076  22  7,384
6    8  53,6  7,051  27,7  7,558
7    9,6  55,3  9,032  37  9,154
8    13,5  50,1  12,4  50  11,573
9    18,4  51,4  15,136  66,5  13,664
10   23,5  50,9  22,702  79  15,853
11   25,45  50,2  53,593  74,4  16,569
12   26,766  50,4  98,839  75,4  18,556
1 1924 28  51,2  178,51  78,3  21,353
2    30,3  50,7  333,018  83,7  24,655
3    32,8  51  866,504  82,2  27,128
4    33,8  51,3  768,101  75,1  30,113
5    35,2  53,4  740,236  67,6  31,086
6    36,7  53,3  -  60,5  31,869
7    38,75  51,9  -  60,9  30,346
8    41,75  50,1  -  57,6  31,355
9    46,156  46,8  -  56,9  31,314
10   51,887  44  -  55,7  30,498
11   -  -  -  -  32,649
Source: Katzenellenbaum (1925), p. 104, p. 176.  
 
The "victory" of the chervonetz is evident from the dynamic of the price indices, 
denominated in sovznaks and chervonetz respectively; from the exchange rate between the two   12
currencies (which is a floating one) as well as from the stabilization of the chervonetz exchange 
rate towards the dollar and the pound 
26 (table 7).  
 
Table 7 The exchange rate of the chervonetz at the Moscow Exchange at the beginning of every 
month and Purchasing Power of the Chervonetz 
 
    Exchange rate in 
Soviet (1923 
issue) roubles 
Exchange rate in 
UK Pounds 
(parity - 1.057) 
Exchange rate 
in US Dollars 
(parity - 5.14) 
Purchasing 




prices of the 
Gosplan 
Purchasing 
Power of the 
Chervonetz In 
detail prices 
index of the 
Inst. Of "Econ. 
Conjuncture" 
12  1922  117  1,17  5,087  -  - 
1  1923  175  1,219  5,426  10,4  6,99 
2    209  1,259  5,186  9,62  6,8 
3    239,5  1,128  5,206  8,63  6,29 
4    302  1,168  5,206  8,7  6,45 
5    457  1,033  4,408  9,18  6,71 
6    570  0,856  3,851  7,92  5,59 
7    760  1,02  4,662  6,88  4,87 
8    1120  1,037  4,765  6,32  4,41 
9    2000  1,047  4,591  6,36  4,79 
10    4000  1,066  4,878  6,39  5,24 
11    7000  1,093  4,827  6,7  4,48 
12    13700  1,055  4,594  6,36  4,81 
1  1924  30000  1,064  4,545  5,92  4,18 
2    82000  1,085  4,608  5,36  3,89 
3    300000  1,103  4,739  5,18  3,88 
4    500000  1,196  5,141  5,53  3,97 
5    -  1,174  5,141  5,71  4,39 
6    -  1,193  5,145  6,03  4,46 
7    -  1,189  5,141  5,91  4,52 
8    -  1,169  5,141  5,7  4,26 
9    -  1,145  5,141  5,8  4,24 
10    -  1,152  5,141  6,09  4,55 
Source: Katzenellenbaum (1925), p. 108, p. 111 
 
The chervonetz’ convertibility at a number of European markets (in China, Italy, Austria, 
USA, Japan, Germany, Iran and Turkey) brings about a symbolic rhyme which the working men 
of USSR use to appraise the international role of the currency:  
 
                                                 
26 The analysis of the currency substitution and in general of the hyperinflation period in Russia has been 
undertaken by Bernholz (2003), as well as Cagan (1956), within his famous model of money demand.     13
„Britt, frantsuz, poliak, iaponetz, 
Ochelomlenii vpolne, 
Chto okrep uje chervonez 
V proletarskoi storone. 
Zagranichnie bankirii 
Uje stali uveriat’ 
Chto Chervonnoi im Rossii  
Nevozmojno ne priznat’”, Gleiser (1993, [1978]) 
 
“The Brit, the Frenchman, the Pole, the Japanese are stunned completely,  
That a chervonetz of the proletarian country became already firm 
Foreign bankers began even to assure that there is no way not to recognize a Pure  
Gold Russia”, Gleiser (1993, [1978]), my translation.
 27 
 
Thus  through  the  currency,  Russia  succeeds  to  return ( at  least  partly)  to  the  world 
economy. Subsequently, sooner rather than later, the chervonets’ quotation was terminated in 
1926 because its export was banned and in 1928 the ban included its import. This quick change is 
in line with the general tendency of undermining the monetary stability (together with the issuance 









Graph 1  
Dynamics of the monetary supply, the price index and the real monetary supply (1914 – 
1924) – logarithmic scale 
 
                                                 
27 It is interesting that international official recognition of Bolshevik Russia takes place in 1924 when the 
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Due to the high values of the variables after 1921 – 1922 , when the money was intentionally 
“annihilated”, graph 1 cannot present the monetary base growth in the period until the beginning of 
1922 and the price index until the beginning of 1921 (they look like a straight line). There is no 
doubt that before 1921 – 1922 the currency in circulation and the prices rise. This can be partly   15
observed from the curve of the monetary supply in real terms as well as from graphs 2 and 3. It 
should also be acknowledged that in the first years of the war communism the monetary base 
actually shrinks because the money is replaced by exchange in kind and central planning but also 
by various private money and currency substitutions, which are not counted in the official statistics. 
This is partly observed on graph 3 which presents a very small currency growth until 1922. It can 
also be inferred that inflation presupposes and later overrates the currency growth rate. Graph 3 
shows the abrupt decline of the Soviet government’s monetary income (seigniorage) and its 
money evasion which is also one of the main reasons for introducing the chervonetz.   
 
Graph 3  
Annual growth of the monetary supply, prices and seigniorage (calculated by E. Preobrazhensky), 














Let us now see what the short Soviet experience in monetary competition can contribute to the 




IV. Instead of a conclusion: what this experience tells us? 
   16
Firstly, in order to be successful, each institutional competition needs to develop within the 
framework of a general competitive economic model, which requires the presence and overall 
functioning of a number of basic institutions – above all property rights, private initiative, free 
price-setting etc. In other words what is needed is a certain minimal level of institutional 
complementarity
28 and at least a minimal institutional coherence that would allow currency 
competition to flourish (i.e. a stable credibility of the currency)
29. The NEP’s economy does 
not embody these characteristics neither in its economics nor in its political and ideological 
sphere. The lack of an institutional system in the NEP’s economic policy meant  “The 
Bolsheviks thought they could pick and choose elements of a market economy” (Johnson and 
Temin, 1994, p. 765). Despite the evidence of Lenin’s citations (where he claimed that the 
NEP was “taken seriously and meant to last long”), or the later Buharin’s concordant claims, 
even they did not see the NEP in general as a radical break off with the War Communism and 
as introducing a model of competition and market economy
30. This is evident from even the 
most basic economic data, which shows that in the moment when the Chervonetz becomes the 
only legal tender in 1924 the private sector begins to shrink in all its spheres (in fact it has never 
exceeded 25% of the economy). The dynamics of production is shown on table 8. The fact 
that in retail, where the private sector was 75.2% of the turnover in 1922 - 23, it sinks to 
22.4% in 1927 – 28, speaks for itself  (Bandera, 1963, p. 269). The excess issuance of 
money, the credits to the government granted by the Gossbank and the sudden reduction of 
the backing of the Chervonetz began as early as 1925. At this time the Soviet economy, in 
spite the declarations remained a closed economy (in both its trade and finance flows), the 
quick loss of convertibility of the Chervonetz has already been mentioned.  
 
Table 8  




State   Cooperative  Private and Concessionary 
1923-24  70.3  5  24.7 
1924-25  72.2  9.1  18.7 
1925-26  74.7  9.0  16.3 
1926-27  77.1  8.8  14.1 
Source: Bandera (1963), p. 268 (data are from: Segal, L., B. Tal (1929), Economic policy of 
soviets’ government, Moscow and Leningrad, p. 165) 
 
The inconsistency of the NEP economic model (some call it a “hybrid model”) is well 
formulated by V. Bandera who otherwise pleads for building a “hybrid model of socialism”:   
 
                                                 
28 Part of the principles of institutional complementarity can be derived within the framework of the theory of 
systems, from the necessity for their synergy etc. 
29 The principles of institutional complementarity have not been the subject of in-depth theoretical analysis, 
though some interesting publications can be found (for example the book by Aoki, 2000). 
30 For details see Lih (1986, 1991). According to Lih (1991), Bukharin used to accept that a competition could 
exist only between socialism and capitalism and he never accepted competition within socialism itself (p. 247-
248). In fact he does not evolve much from his earlier positions, when he analyses War Communism (see 
Bukharin, 1989, [1920, 1928]). On Stalin’s views, who in fact never liked the NEP, see Himmer (1994). Trotzky’s 
views are clear- he was against the NEP.   17
“As under perfect competition, the private sector had to accept prices as given parameters; but 
unlike conditions under perfect competitions, prices were not primarily determined by the market. 
Furthermore, the preponderance of state monopolies in the economy greatly restricted the scope 
for private initiative and created an atmosphere of uncertainty for atomistic decision units. The 
restraints on private initiative without doubt prevented numerous socially desirable activities from 
being undertaken by the private sector. […]. The conditions of production and exchange during 
NEP may be summarized as follows. The state was preponderant in certain industries and, 
hence, was able to undertake structural adjustments according to the preferences of ruling elite. 
The private sector, which controlled limited resources except in agriculture, could make only 
marginal adjustments”, Bandera, 1963, p. 275. 
 
The second  important feature (besides that it functions within a general non-competitive 
environment) is that the currency competition between the sovznak and the chervonetz is 
partial, limited and to a great extent manipulated (especially in its beginning). In fact the 
introduction of the chervonetz was dictated by purely political and pragmatic goals (retaining 
the power, improving the conditions of the peasants mainly, establishing the new political 
power internationally, improving the opportunities for foreign borrowing etc.). But in fact the 
Bolsheviks’ hostile attitude towards money remains, other elements of private property were 
also disdained (despite the slogans “Get rich!”). In particular, mainly at the beginning of the 
parallel circulation of the currencies, their spheres of usage were divided, the sovznaks 
circulated in the public sector while the chervontzi operated in the private and informal sectors. 
Interestingly, the way currency competition was manipulated (at least in the beginning) is 
revealed in the following: while the government debt denominated in sovznaks devaluated 
quickly, the income from taxes was legally binded in chervontzi. Whether or not this was an 
intentionally created demand for money, it confirms the hypothesis that currency competition 
was in a way a temporary solution to the Bolsheviks’ problems with their internal debt and 
public finances (the political tasks were mentioned before). The period of currency competition 
was very short (17 months) and ended with declaring the chervonetz’ monopoly. In fact, for a 
(certain) competition to be successful (in this case institutional competition) it needs to be 
continuous! Or, if a (certain) currency has been established by the choice of its users, it is 
necessary that this currency be subject to a potential new competition, t. e. the market for 
monetary institutions to be open.  
 
Thirdly, it is important to emphasize that despite all its imperfections and limitations the parallel 
circulation of the sovznak and the chervonets show that there are certain intrinsic technological 
mechanisms which can function (to a certain limit!) regardless of the institutional background 
and ideological environment. It comes down to the principle that the credibility of the currency 
(as well as of any given institution) is a result of comparison with an alternative currency. The 
money users (national or supranational money) always choose the money with the most stable 
purchasing power. They choose the kind of money which is less manipulable by politicians and 
which is subject to stricter rules of issue (a legal convertibility and backing with a certain stable 
foreign currency). The credibility in certain monies and in the monetary discipline is ultimately 
granted by the consumers of money and monetary services and not by decrees of the relevant 
centralized authorities.    18
Annex Table 9  
Dynamics of the main variables in Russia during the crises, observed in the period 1905 – 1997   
In %, % change minimum (% change maximum) 
 
  National 
product 
Agrarian Economy   Industry  Transport  Investment in fixed capital 




Passengers’   
1905-
1906 
-10 (-15)  -15 (-20)  -20 (-25)  -5 (-10)  -5 (-
10) 
-  -5 (-10)  0 (-5)  -20 (-30) 
1916-
1917 
-20 (-25)  -10 (-15)  -20 (-25)  0 (-5)  -25 (-
30) 
-30 (-35)  -20 (-25)  -10 (-15)  - 
1918-
1921 
-45 (-50)  -30 (-35)  -35 (-40)  -25 (-30)  -70 (-
75) 
-50 (-55)  -75 (-80)  -50 (-55)  -75 (-85) 
1932-
1933 
-5 (-10 )  -30 (-35)  -20 (-25)  -50 (-55)  +10 
(+5) 
-5 (-10)  0 (-5)  -10 (-15)  -10 (-20) 
1940-
1946 
-30 (-35)  -50 (-55)  -55 (-60)  -45 (50)  -30 (-
35) 
-45 (-50)  -35 (-40)  -45 (-50)  -40 (-50) 
1990-
1991 
-10 (-15)  -5 (-10)  -5 (-10)  -5 (-10)  -5 (-
10) 
-5 (-10)  -10 (-15)  -10 (-15)  -10 (-20) 
1992-
1997 
-40 (-45)  -30 (-35)  -20 (25)  -40 (-45)  -50 (-
55) 
-55 (-60)  -45 (-50)  -35 (-40)  -65 (-75) 
Source: Poletaev (2001), p. 222 
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